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Abstract
Machine learning models have been successfully applied to a wide range of ap-
plications including computer vision, natural language processing, and speech
recognition. A successful implementation of these models however, usually relies
on deep neural networks (DNNs) which are treated as opaque black-box systems
due to their incomprehensible complexity and intricate internal mechanism. In this
work, we present a novel algorithm for explaining the predictions of a DNN using
adversarial machine learning. Our approach identifies the relative importance of
input features in relation to the predictions based on the behavior of an adversarial
attack on the DNN. Our algorithm has the advantage of being fast, consistent, and
easy to implement and interpret. We present our detailed analysis that demonstrates
how the behavior of an adversarial attack, given a DNN and a task, stays consistent
for any input test data point proving the generality of our approach. Our analysis
enables us to produce consistent and efficient explanations. We illustrate the effec-
tiveness of our approach by conducting experiments using a variety of DNNs, tasks,
and datasets. Finally, we compare our work with other well-known techniques in
the current literature.
1 Introduction
Explaining the outcomes of complex machine learning models is a perquisite for establishing trust
between the machines and users. As humans increasingly rely on DNNs to processing large amounts
of data and make decisions, it is crucial to develop solutions that can interpret the predictions of
DNNs in a user-friendly manner. Explaining the outcomes of a model can help reduce bias and
contribute to improvements in model design, performance, and accountability by providing beneficial
insights into how models behave [1]. Consequently, the field of explainable artificial intelligence
systems, XAI, has gained traction in recent years, where researchers from different disciplines have
come together to define, design and evaluate explainable systems [2–4]. The majority of current
explainability algorithms for DNNs produce an explanation for a single input-output pair: an input
data point fed into the DNN and the respective prediction made by the DNN. The algorithm usually
finds the most important features in the input contributing the most to the model’s predictions and
selects those as explanations for the model’s behavior [5]. The majority of these algorithms find
the important features using either a perturbation-based approach or a saliency-based approach [6].
The saliency-based approaches rely on gradients of the outputs in relation to the inputs to find the
important features [7, 8]. Perturbation-based methods on the other hand apply small local changes to
the input, track the changes in the output, and find and rank the important input features [9, 10].
One main problem with current state-of-the-art explainability tools is their reliance on a large set
of hyper-parameters. This leads to local instability of explanations and can negatively affect the
user’s experience [5]. An explainability algorithm should satisfy 3 properties: 1- It has to produce
human-understandable explanations, 2- It has to be locally consistent and efficient, 3- It should be
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user-friendly, easy to apply and quick in providing explanations. In this work, we propose a new
algorithm, explanations via adversarial attacks, which satisfies these 3 important properties and more.
We call our method Adversarial Explainations for Artificial Intelligence systems or AXAI 1. AXAI
inherits from the nature of adversarial attacks to automatically find and select important features
affecting the model’s prediction to produce explanations. The idea behind our work comes from
the natural behavior of adversarial attacks. The attacks tend to manipulate important features in the
input to deceive a DNN. The logic is simple, rather than trying to build a model that learns to explain
the DNN’s behavior, why don’t we utilize the nature of attacks to learn this behavior? One who
knows how to fool a model, certainly knows what the model may be thinking. Another benefit of
our approach is that certain attacks, such as the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) method [11], are
fast, efficient, and consistent in their adversarial behavior. Our work further aims to solve at least 2
problems: 1- Provide fast explanations without a need for model training, 2- Reduce the need for
selecting a large set of hyper-parameters to produce consistent results.
Obviously, one needs to first show how adversarial attacks link to explainbility, i.e., how an attack
can point to the important features in the input and how one can filter out the unimportant ones to
produce explanations. Further, one needs to show how an adversary behaves similarly in its approach
across models, tasks and datasets so that the explanations are consistent, stable, and applicable to
a large group of models. Here, we present a novel algorithm for explaining the DNN’s predictions
in multiple domains including text, audio and image. In particular, this paper makes the following
contributions:
• We show that given an `2 PGD attack and a trained DNN, the distribution of attack magni-
tudes vs. frequency across all unseen test inputs follows a beta distribution, regardless of the
task and dataset. We also show that these distributions are symmetric and the differences
between their means, medians, and quantiles are not statistically significant.
• We show that the most important input features, i.e., features with the largest effect on the
model’s predictions, can be found using a consistent rule across different DNN architectures,
datasets, and tasks. This rule leverages the properties of the distributions explained above.
• We propose a novel algorithm for explaining the outcomes of DNNs and provide a detailed
analysis of our algorithm’s performance for different DNN architectures, datasets and tasks.
• We benchmark our algorithm against methods such as LIME and SHAP [6, 9] and show
that our algorithm performs faster while producing similar or better explainability results.
2 Related Work
One of the popular explainability solutions called LIME [9] assumes that DNNs are linear locally.
LIME trains weighted linear models on the top of the DNN for perturbed samples around a target input
to produce explanations. The computational bottleneck in LIME is caused by the training part where a
selected number of perturbed samples are sent through the DNN for learning the explanation. Certain
combination of LIME’s hyper-parameters can produce unstable results [5]. DeepLIFT produces
explanations by modeling the slope of gradient changes of output with respect to the input [12].
Grad-CAM is a saliency-based method that uses the gradients of the input at the final convolutional
layer to produce coarse localization maps pointing to important regions in the input [8]. The majority
of approaches based on sensitivity maps fail to produce explanations that only rely on important
features. Creators of DeepLIFT associate this lack of stability to the behavior of activation functions
such as ReLU. [13] proposed Smooth Grad which uses gradients and Gaussian based de-noising
methods to produce stable explanations. The authors of the paper mention that large outlier values in
the gradient maps produced by gradient differentiation may cause instability. In our algorithm, we
overcome the problem of instability by utilizing the density of attacks, which are created iteratively
on segments. Some other important works in this area are given in [14–20].
DNNs are vulnerable to subtle adversarial perturbations applied to their input. The basic idea behind
most adversarial attacks revolves around solving a maximization problem with a constraint that keeps
the distance between the original input and adversarial input small, so that the adversarial input, while
capable of fooling the DNN, is not perceptually recognizable by humans. The connection between
model interpretation and attacks has recently gravitated the interest of researchers. [21] and [22]
1Code will be readily available.
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showed that one benefit of adversarial examples is that they reveal useful insights into the salient
features of input data and their effects on DNNs’ predictions. Our solution relies on the nature of
adversarial attacks to select and produce important and explainable features given a specific input and
DNN. Our work puts more emphasis on model interpretability, where we make use of the information
obtained from an adversarial attack on a DNN to de-noise the sensitivity maps and produce stable
explanations. We de-noise the gradient map by utilizing the iterative nature of the PGD attack and by
considering only a minimum number of highly influential gradients that contribute the most to the
predictions. We use the density of gradients in a number of segments to remove the noise that was
not filtered out in the previous steps and produce human-interpretable explanations.
3 Main Results
The core idea behind our approach, AXAI, is to utilize the knowledge gained from an adversarial
attack on a DNN and an input, to find the important features in the input in order to produce good
explanations. This is done by mapping “carefully filtered attacked inputs” onto predefined segments
and filtering out the unimportant features. This will be discussed in more detail in later sections. First
let’s look at an example in Fig. 1 to see how our approach works. Given an image classification DNN,
the `2 adversarial attack changes the pixels in the entire image, as seen in Fig. 1c. The reason for
this is simple: each pixel value is changed by the adversary so that the accumulated loss value can
increase enough to fool the DNN. Fig. 1b shows the distribution of the attack on this image. The
x-axis represents the magnitude of the pixel changes and the y-axis represents the number of pixels
given each value on x-axis. AXAI maps the strongly attacked pixels to the image segments of the
original image and filters out the segments with highest density of attacked pixels which meet certain
criteria to produce explanations. Fig. 1c shows the value changes for the important attacked pixels.
As we will show, the important features used for explanations are located at specific sections in the
tails of the distribution given in Fig. 1b. These are the pixels that directly affect the classification
decision made by the model. We use QuickShift [23] for segmenting the input image (Fig. 1d). Fig.
1e shows the explanation produced by our algorithm.
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(b) Attack Magnitude vs. Freq. (c) Adversarial changes in pixels
(d) Image segments (e) Explanation
Figure 1: A simple example depicting the steps taken in AXAI to produce explanations.
Algorithm 1 details the steps taken by AXAI to produce an explanation E for the output of a selected
model f . Suppose that input X is segmented into p groups using a segmentation method and that the
attack magnitudes for the input X and DNN f are obtained. Let Xdiff be the difference between the
original X and adversarial X ′. We filter out the low intensity attack magnitudes Xdiff and create a
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Boolean array Xdifft, where values larger than a threshold, are only set to True. Let Su be the set of
unique segments, Su = {Su1, . . . , Sup}. Next, we map the filtered attack Xdifft to the segments
Su, and create a new list of filtered attack groups, Sux = {Sux1 , . . . , Suxp}. The mapping function,
Map in Algorithm 1, simply stacks the filtered attacks on the segments and groups the filtered attack
Xdifft based on the segments. Finally, the attack density of each unique segment can be written
as Sud = { card(Sux1 )card(Su1) , . . . ,
card(Suxp )
card(Sup)
} (Calculate_density in Algorithm 1). We then extract the
indices j’s of the top K maximum values in Sud (TopK_indices in Algorithm 1), and produce Su(j)
as explanation E for the input X . In next sections, we explain each step in details.
Algorithm 1 AXAI
Require: Model f , input X
1: X ′ ← Attack(f,X) . i.e. PGD attack
2: Xdiff = x′ − x . The attack magnitudes
3: Xdifft ← Threshold(Xdiff ) . Filtered attack magnitudes
4: Su← Segment(X))
5: Sux ←Map(Xdifft, Su) . Group attack magnitudes based on segmentation
6: Sud ← Calculate_density(Sux) . Calculate attacks per segment
7: return Su(TopK_indices(Sud))
3.1 White-box adversarial attacks
Adversary can attack a DNN by adding engineered noise to the input to increase the associated
loss value, if it has some prior knowledge of the DNN including the weights and biases. AXAI
utilizes Projected Gradient Descend (PGD) attack [11], although any `2 adversarial attack can replace
PGD in our algorithm (Appendix B). However, PGD provides specific benefits such as stability and
gradient smoothness that other attacks do not. PGD can be thought of as an iterative version of `2
Fast Gradient Method (FGM) attack [24], where in each iteration, the adversarial changes are clipped
into an `2 ball of some  value. PGD is generally considered a strong stable attack and is defined as,
xt+1 = ux+S(xt + ∇xL(Θ, x, y)), (1)
where for t iterations, x and y are the inputs and outputs, and Θ are the weights and biases.
3.2 Statistical analysis of attack magnitudes vs. frequency distributions
Here, we briefly report our statistical analysis of attack magnitudes vs. frequency distributions for a
fixed DNN, dataset and an adversarial attack. We can show that the distributions are similar in their
“shapes,” “means,” “mean ranks,” “medians,” and “quantiles,” and follow a Beta distribution with
specific parameters. Given that there is no significant difference in the distributions, we can provide a
universal threshold using quantiles which separates the important features from the rest to produce
explanations.
We can measure the symmetricity of distributions using the Fisher-Pearson coefficient of skewness.
We present the results for AlexNet on CIFAR10 [25], VGG16 on CIFAR100 [26] and ResNet34 on
ImageNet [27]. The Fisher-Pearson coefficients of the attack magnitudes vs. frequency distributions
for all cases are shown in Fig. 2. It is seen that the skewness of all distributions falls within the
[−0.5, 0.5] range showing strong evidence that they are approximately symmetric [28]. Only 0.9% of
CIFAR10, 3.3% of CIFAR100 and 1.9% of ImageNet test datasets lie outside of [−0.5, 0.5] range.
Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) plot allows us to understand how the quantiles of a distribution deviate from
a specified theoretical distribution. The theoretical distribution selected is the normal distribution. The
x-axis and y-axis represent the quantile values of the theoretical and sample distributions, respectively.
While it is unlikely to have identical distributions that perfectly match, one can look at different parts
of the Q-Q plot to distinguish between the similar and dissimilar locations in the distributions. Fig. 3
shows the Q-Q plots for random subsets of ImageNet and CIFAR10 test datasets each containing
1000 images. It is seen that the distributions follow a fairly straight line in the middle portion of the
curve, while deviating at the upper and lower parts. This provides some evidence supporting the
hypothesis that distributions follow a ‘near-normal’ distribution with heavier tails.
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(a) PGD, AlexNet, CIFAR10
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(b) PGD, VGG16, CIFAR100
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(c) PGD, ResNet34, ImageNet
Figure 2: The Fisher-Pearson coefficient of attack magnitudes vs. frequency distributions.
2 0 2
Theoretical Quantiles
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Sa
m
pl
e 
Qu
an
til
es
(a) PGD, AlexNet, CIFAR10
2 0 2
Theoretical Quantiles
0.10
0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
Sa
m
pl
e 
Qu
an
til
es
(b) PGD, ResNet34, ImageNet
Figure 3: The Q-Q plot of sample distributions vs. theoretical normal distribution (mean=0, std=1).
t-test (CIFAR10) Mann-Whitney (CIFAR10) t-test (ImageNet) Mann-Whitney (ImageNet)
p-value 0.70 0.58 0.64 0.55
Table 1: p-values for the mean similarity statistical tests at significance level 0.05.
We perform the two-sample location t-test and Mann-Whitney U test to determine if there is a
significant difference between two groups where the null hypothesis is the equality of the means.
Carrying out pair t-tests on all samples allows us to be conservative in confirming the mean similarity
of the distributions. A sample here is defined as the attack magnitudes vs. frequency distribution
for a data point in the test adversarial dataset created by the PGD attack on a DNN trained on the
training dataset. The results reported in Table 1 indicate no significant difference between the means.
Further, the Mann-Whitney U test results indicate that all pairs are similar to each other on the mean
ranks. Under the assumption of two distributions having similar shapes, one could further state that
Mann-Whitney test can be considered as a test of medians [29]. Since, we have shown that the shapes
are similar, we can conclude that there are no significant difference between the medians of the
distributions. Further details in addition to the results for the ANOVA test are given in Appendix C.
Next, to show consistency across distributions for a given model, dataset and attack, we estimate the
values of quantiles, means and medians. We do this by estimating the statistics of the distributions
and constructing confidences intervals. For each experiment, we estimate the mean, median, 15th,
25th, 75th and 85th quantiles of each attack magnitude vs. frequency distribution for the entire test
dataset. The statistical confidence interval estimations at confidence level of 95% are reported in
Table 2. Our results show that the confidence intervals have narrow ranges and the estimations are
consistent. The estimates for the 15th, 25th, 75th and 85th quantiles indicate a strong symmetricity
with respect to the origin in all cases. This matches the results of the skewness test in Fig. 2. Another
observation is that the confidence interval of the mean and medians are pretty narrow, supporting the
results of the t-tests and Mann-Whitney U test. Finally, we can show with high confidence that the
distributions consistently follow a beta distribution. The beta distribution is a family of distributions
defined by two positive shape parameters, denoted by p and q. The estimated p and q of the beta
distribution are reported in Table 3. Further technical details on our analyses presented in this section,
in addition to further experiments with audio and text input types, are provided in Appendix C.
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AlexNet, CIFAR10, PGD VGG16, CIFAR100, PGD ResNet34, ImageNet, PGD
15th Quantile (−1.807e− 02,−1.805e− 02) (−1.419e− 02,−1.414e− 02) (−1.785e− 03,−1.777e− 03)
25th Quantile (−1.145e− 02,−1.071e− 02) (−8.153e− 03,−8.110e− 03) (−1.015e− 03,−1.101e− 03)
Mean (1.775e− 05, 2.295e− 05) (−6.850e− 06,−3.624e− 06) (−1.090e− 07,−6.000e− 08)
Median (2.115e− 06, 1.127e− 05) (−2.842e− 06, 4.467e− 06) (−2.155e− 07,−9.381e− 08)
75th Quantile (1.071e− 02, 1.073e− 02) (8.102e− 03, 8.146e− 03) (1.011e− 03, 1.016e− 03)
85th Quantile (1.809e− 02, 1.812e− 02) (1.413e− 02, 1.418e− 02) (1.777e− 03, 1.785e− 03)
Table 2: Estimations for mean, median, 15th , 25th, 75th and 85th quantiles at 95% confidence level.
AlexNet, CIFAR10, PGD VGG16, CIFAR100, PGD ResNet34, ImageNet, PGD
p (1.124e+ 01, 1.132e+ 01) (2.129e+ 01, 2.171e+ 01) (1.306e+ 02, 1.329e+ 02)
q (1.136e+ 01, 1.145e+ 01) (2.124e+ 01, 2.164e+ 01) (1.303e+ 02, 1.326e+ 02)
Table 3: Statistical estimations for parameters of beta distribution at 95% confidence level.
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Figure 4: Visualization of the re-attacking process where only portions of inputs lying outside the red
lines are attacked ([0%, α%], [(100− α)%, 100%] ) (b) AlexNet, CIFAR10 (c) ResNet34, ImageNet
CIFAR10, AlexNet ImageNet, ResNet34 CIFAR10, AlexNet ImageNet, ResNet34
Attack Percentile Attack Percentile
15%− 85% 0.78 0.88 0%− 15%&85%− 100% 0.16 0.07
10%− 90% 0.26 0.79 0%− 10%&90%− 100% 0.26 0.13
5%− 95% 0.50 0.63 0%− 5%&95%− 100% 0.45 0.25
1%− 99% 0.07 0.12 0%− 1%&99%− 100% 0.92 0.80
Table 4: Adversarial test accuracy where only features within a certain percentile of the attack
magnitudes vs. frequency distributions are attacked (PGD with 20 Iterations).
3.3 Quantile selection for the explanations
Our algorithm produces explanations that rely only on the features in the input that have the largest
effect on the predictions. While the majority of the input is attacked, our belief is that only important
features are strongly attacked. We show how one can select the boundary threshold between “ex-
plainable features” and the rest based on attack magnitudes. We demonstrate this with 2 experiments:
1) AlexNet trained on CIFAR10, 2) ResNet34 trained on ImageNet, both attacked by PGD with 20
iterations. In each case, we select the successfully attacked inputs from the adversarial test dataset,
i.e., the inputs that fool the DNN. We then only re-attack specific features of the original clean
inputs within the [0%, α%] and [(100− α)%, 100%] percentile of the distributions, where α is the
percentage threshold. The re-attacking process starts from α = 0, where none of the input features
are attacked, and then we gradually increase the value of α until the attack successfully changes the
prediction, and then we save the value of α (Fig. 4a). We repeat this for every input. The probability
density distribution of α’s are given in Fig. 4b and Fig. 4c with an estimated mean of α = 15.
Further, we report the test accuracies of the DNNs on the adversarial test datasets that are created
based on different attack percentiles. Given an attack percentile range, the adversarial test dataset
consists of adversarial test inputs which are created by attacking only portions of the input features
that lie withing a specific percentile range of the attack magnitudes vs. frequency distributions similar
to above. This allows us to understand how the features lying in the middle area, tails and outliers of
the distributions affect the DNN’s predictions. Our findings are reported in Table 4. Our results show
that the majority of the input features including those within the first two standard deviations and
the outliers of the distributions do not have a strong effect on the predictions. A smaller portion of
the input features which are also those attacked with the highest intensity, i.e., within the [0%, 15%]
and [85%, 100%] percentiles of the distributions have the largest effect on the DNN’s predictions,
confirming our hypothesis. We see the same trend across different DNNs and datasets (Appendix C).
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4 Experiment Results
Earlier, we provided a sample explanation created by AXAI for an image classifier. Appendix E
contains more experiments for image classification and object detection DNNs. Further, Appendix
E contains an ablation study and an interesting comparison between explanations produced by a
non-robust model and an adversarially robust model. Here, we provide sample explanations produced
by our algorithm for speech recognition and language-based tasks.
4.1 Explaining a speech recognition model
The Speech Commands Dataset [30] is an audio dataset of short spoken words. Here, we have
converted the audio files to spectrograms and used them to train a LeNet model to identify “speech
commands.” We have created time-frequency segments by dividing the spectrogram into time-
frequency grids similar to [31]. The x-axis and y-axis indicate the time-scale and log-scale frequency
of the spectograms respectively, and the color bar indicates the magnitude. The spectrogram of the
first word "Right" and its explanation are shown in Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b. The explanation shows that
the first and last character in the spoken word “Right” stand out as important features ([0.4s, 0.6s] and
[1.0s, 1.2s] intervals). This is reasonable because “Five” is the neighboring class of “Right” in the
dataset (Appendix D) and “Right” and “Five” differ in the pronunciation of “r” and “f” and “t” and
“v.” The second example is for the word “Three” (Fig. 5c and Fig. 5d). The produced explanation
indicates the importance of “Thr” ([1.4s, 1.7s] interval). This is reasonable because “Three” and its
neighbor “Tree” differ in the letter “h” in “Thr,” and this difference is learned by the model during
training to identify the two words correctly. More details on this experiment are given in Appendix E.
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(b) Explanation
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(c) "Three"
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(d) Explanation
Figure 5: The AXAI explanations for the LeNet speech recognition model.
4.2 Explaining a text classification model
The Sentence Polarity Dataset [32] is a collection of movie-review documents labeled with respect
to their overall sentiment polarity. Here, we will look at a negative and positive example (Fig. 6a
and Fig. 6b) where the rows are the word tokens in the sentence, and the columns are the embedding
dimensions. The NLP model used in our experiment is taken from [33] and trained on the dataset. As
part of the pre-processing, the words in the dataset are tokenized and mapped to an embedding matrix.
[34] mentions that the saliency map of an NLP model can be visualized using the embedding layer
similar to saliency maps used for image-based models. Consequently, one can apply our algorithm
to NLP models in a similar manner, i.e., we can utilize the first order derivative of the loss with
respect to the word embedding. This technique is similar to what was used in [35]. The first example,
“it’s a glorified sitcom, and a long, unfunny one at that.” is classified as a negative review by the
model. Fig. 6a shows that the word “unfunny” is strongly highlighted as the main explanation for
this prediction. For the positive example “a work of astonishing delicacy and force,” it is seen that the
word “astonishing” has the most significant influence on model’s prediction.
4.3 Benchmark tests
We test our algorithm against LIME and SHAP (Gradient Explainer). It is important to note that
SHAP subsumes a number of prior approaches and provides a fair baseline. To show the consistency
of our approach, we present visualizations for 3 cases: 1) AlexNet, CIFAR10, 2) VGG16, CIFAR100,
3) ResNet34, ImageNet using the 3 explainability tools and provide more experiments in Appendix
F. The algorithms produce similar explanations where AXAI has fewer tune-able parameters and
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Figure 6: The AXAI explanations for the sentence classification model.
Single CPU (Intel Core i5-7360U) Single GPU (Tesla V100-SXM2)
LIME 105s 5.8s
SHAP (Gradient Explainer) 35s 3.8s
AXAI (PGD with 20 iters) 6.6s 1.7s
Table 5: Benchmark running-time experiments.
performs faster. LIME fails to produce good explanations for low-resolution CIFAR10 images. In
Appendix F, we provide examples showing that AXAI outperforms LIME for low-resolution inputs.
We benchmark the running-time performance of AXAI, LIME and SHAP for ResNet34 trained on
ImageNet on a single CPU (Intel Core i5-7360U) and single GPU (Tesla V100-SXM2) on the entire
test dataset. The results are given in Table. 5. LIME is the slowest to produce explanations. This
is because LIME needs to forward propagate the perturbed inputs through the DNN several times.
SHAP also slower to generate the results in comparison to AXAI. LIME works better on a GPU.
AXAI maintains its relative performance on the CPU and GPU. This is because the segmentation step
which mainly uses the CPU is the main computational bottleneck for the algorithms (Appendix A).
5 Final Remarks and Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new approach for explaining the predictions of DNNs. Interpretability is
directly related to the readability of an explanation [36]. An explanation relying on thousands of fea-
tures is not interpretable. AXAI, similar to LIME, uses input segmentation to create human-readable
explanations focused on important input features. Further, AXAI has the following properties,
Property 1 (Robustness): Our approach is more robust to the changes in segmentation hyper-
parameters in comparison to other segmentation based approaches such as LIME. This is because
AXAI does not require a surrogate model trained on “randomly perturbed inputs.” AXAI uses
the deterministic attack magnitudes as “base explanations" for a given DNN and dataset, and uses
segments as an “aid” to visualize the results. The segmentation affects the visualizations. We further
explain this in Appendix A. Robustness is identical to stability of explanations as defined in [37].
A lower number of non-deterministic steps in the algorithm enhances stability. A carefully filtered
explanation based on our approach simply removes the features that have a low impact on predictions.
One can interpret this process as a de-noising step to create a sparse representation of explanations.
Property 2 (Local attribution): Our algorithm is locally stable and uses local attributes to produce
explanations. This is because an adversarial attack uses the most minimal amount of noise within an
`2 ball of some small  to fool the DNN. Given the un-targeted nature of the attack used in AXAI,
the distributions can be interpreted as estimations of the boundaries among neighboring classes.
Thus, one can conclude that the attack magnitudes are a representation of feature contributions to the
predictions on a local scale. A similar conclusion is made in [38], where it is argued that gradients
can in fact point to important local attributions of a DNN. We explore this in details in Appendix D.
Property 3 (Completeness): Completeness as a property is described as the ability to accurately
explain the operations of a DNN [36]. An explanation is more complete when it can explain the
behavior of the DNN for a larger set of inputs. [14] and [13] mention the problem of sensitivity and
lack of stability in gradient-based algorithms. In the literature, if a solution can reduce the gradient
“sensitivity” problem, it can be described as having the “completeness” property [36]. AXAI with
PDG attack is complete in the same sense as SmoothGrad is [13]. SmoothGrad takes the average of
saliency maps with added Gaussian noise to reduce sensitivity. The PGD attack behaves in a similar
manner by adding adversarial noise at each iteration. Both solutions add perturbations to the input to
smooth gradient fluctuations. While further research can be done on the power of iterative attacks
in their gradient smoothing effects, we argue that AXAI with iterative PGD does have the desirable
characteristic and produces stable sharpen visualizations of sensitivity maps for robust explanations.
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Broader Impact
Our work in this paper contributes to the fields of adversarial machine learning and artificial intelli-
gence (AI) explainability. There is still a huge gap between building a model in Jupyter notebook
and shipping it as a stand-alone product to the users. Advances in these two fields directly relate to
deploying AI systems that behave in a robust and user-friendly manner after deployment. Building AI
systems is hard. AI explainability can provide insights into how AI models behave, why they make
the decision they make and the reasoning behind their incorrect predictions. Additionally, explaining
the outcomes of a model can help reduce bias and contribute to improvements in accountability and
ethics by providing beneficial insights into how AI models think and make their decisions.
Despite the hype, AI engineers struggle with deploying models which meet the users’ performance
expectations. A lack of robustness in the performance of trained model is a major impediment. We
need to be able to design AI systems that both perform well and are robust. A robust model not
only makes correct predictions in expected environment, but it also maintains an acceptable level of
performance in unpredictable situations. Our work gives insights into how the adversary attacks an
AI system trained to perform a specific task. Understanding how adversarial attacks behave can help
AI engineers in development of AI systems that perform as expected while maintaining some level
of robustness in presence of external disturbances and adversarial noise. This type of information
can help AI engineers in developing AI models that perform better. In short our paper can help AI
researchers in their endeavor to design, develop and deploy explainable ethical AI systems that are
robust and reliable.
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A QuickShift Segmentation
QuickShift is a mode seeking clustering algorithm proposed by [23]. QuickShift creates segments
by repeatedly moving each data point to its closest neighbor point that has higher density calculated
by a Parzen Estimator. The Kernel size argument in the QuickShift function controls the width of
the gaussian kernel of the estimator. The path of moving points can be seen as a tree that connects
data points. Eventually, the algorithm connects all data points into a single tree. To balance between
under and over fragmentation of the image, a threshold, τ , is served as a breaking point that limits
the length of the branches in the QuickShift trees. The threshold, τ , is the Max distance argument in
the QuickShift function. Finally, the pre-processing step of QuickShift projects a given image into
a 5D space, including color space (r, g, b) and location (x, y). A hyper-parameter, λ, takes a value
between 0 and 1 and serves as a weight assigned to the color space, such that the feature space can be
presented as {λr, λg, λb, λx, λy}.
LIME uses QuickShift for image segmentation where the default Kernel Size is 4, the Max distance
is 200, and the threshold τ is 0.2. This combination prevents generating too many image segments.
Even-though the image segmentation process is only performed once per image, we would like to
point out that the parameter selection does change the explanation results slightly. First, increasing the
kernel size increases the computation time while decreasing the number of image segments, making
this parameter the major computational bottleneck in image segmentation. Second, extra care should
be taken when it comes to low-resolution images, when the image is coarse and the number of image
segments are low, because important and unimportant features can easily be merged together, as
demonstrated in Fig. 7. From the perspective of explainability, both accuracy and human-readability
are needed. This is achieved as long as the important segments are not merged with unimportant
ones. This problem can be solved by selecting a small kernel size. In our algorithm, we introduce a
user tunable hyper-parameter, called explainabilty length, K, that allows users to decide the number
of explainable segments. Human-readability is subjective, so we let the user decide the explainable
length, Fig. 8. We see that in Fig. 8, the wall of the castle on the left most side of the image
is merged with the sky due to the similarity between colors. In both case, we picked the top 10
segments as explanations, i.e., explainabilty length=10. It is important to note that unlike LIME and
other explainability algorithms, the choice of a longer explainabilty length (more segments) does not
increase the computational time of our algorithm.
(a) Original image from CIFAR10 (b) Preferable segmentation (c) Under segmentation
Figure 7: Segmentation in low-resolution images.
Deciding the tradeoff between the importance of the color (r,g,b) and spatial components (x,y) of
the feature space, is especially important for high resolution images. Take a castle image in the
ImgeNet dataset as an example (given in Fig. 9). We choose two different parameter combinations
for comparison. The only difference between the two combinations is the λ parameter. For the first
combination, we used 0.2 (Fig. 9b), for the second combination, we used 0.8 (Fig. 9c). One can see
that using a lower λ prevents details from merging with irrelevant background information. In Fig.
9b and Fig. 9c, the total number of segments are nearly the same (73 and 81) but the explanations
have different qualities.
12
(a) Original image from ImageNet (b) Explainabilty length = 1 (c) Explainabilty length = 2
Figure 8: Relationship between produced explanations and explainabilty length.
(a) Original image from ImageNet (b) λ=0.2 (c) λ=0.8
Figure 9: The effects of λ on the explanations produced.
B Convergence of Explanations across Adversarial Attacks
As a tool for explainability, efficiency, accuracy and consistency are of top priority. Our experiments
show that `2 PGD attacks with different iterations create explanations similar to `2 FGM attack. This
points to consistency in explanations produced by our algorithm. PGD attack is an iterative version
of FGM, while both attacks are subjected to an `2 norm. Note that the distribution of the attacks
can influence the explanation results. This also means that since the attack distributions of the first
iteration and later iterations of the PGD attack are nearly identical, the overall explanations remain
the same. In Fig. 10, we provide an example from the ImageNet dataset to show the convergence of
the attacks and consistency of our explanations. Fig. 10b shows the explanation results for an FGM
based algorithm. Fig. 10c and Fig. 10d show the explanation results based on the PGD attack with
different number of iterations. They both look exactly the same. This is because the slight changes
on the attack distribution for different number of iterations, do not affect the overall density of pixel
changes in each segment, thus the final explainability results do not change. This point to stability
and consistency of our algorithm. To further explore the stability and consistency of our approach,
we can segment the image into much smaller segments, as given in Fig. 10e and Fig. 10f, in this
case using 50 times more segments than the previous case and then produce the explanations. In
this case, we do see small differences between an explanation produced with a PGM attack with 10
iterations and one based on a PGM attack with 40 iterations. These small differences are caused
by small differences in the attack distributions in each segment. While it is interesting to further
explore how different types of attacks can lead to more “suitable” explanations, it is important to note
that one could explain the outcomes using our algorithm and with both types of attacks. Further, we
can conclude that using FGM or PGD attacks in our algorithm satisfies consistency, accuracy and
efficiency conditions for producing explanations.
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(a) Original Image from ImageNet (b) `2 FGM (c) PGD with 10 iterations
(d) PGD with 40 iterations (e) PGD with 10 iterations (f) PGD with 40 iterations
Figure 10: Convergence of explanations for different adversarial attacks and number of segments
(Architecture: ResNet34, Dataset: ImageNet).
C Further Details on the Statistical Analyses given in Subsection 3.2
C.1 Further details on the statistical tests
The Fisher-Pearson coefficient g1 of a distribution x with a sample size N is calculated using the
third moment m3 and the second moment m2 of the distribution,
g1 =
m3
m
3
2
2
, (2)
where,
mi =
1
N
N∑
n=1
(x[n]− x¯)i (3)
If skewness is 0, the data is perfectly symmetrical, if skewness is positive, then one interprets the
distribution as skewed right, if skewness is negative, then the distribution is skewed left. [28] pointed
out that there are three levels of symmetricity, a) when skewness is between -0.5 to 0.5, the distribution
is “approximately symmetric,” b) when skewness is within -1 and -0.5 or 0.5 and +1, the distribution
is “moderately skewed,” c) when skewness falls out of the mentioned range, then the distribution is
highly skewed. The Fisher-Pearson coefficient of all attack magnitudes are shown in Fig. 15. It is
seen that the skewness of all attack magnitudes falls within -0.5 an 0.5 showing the strong evidence
that the distributions are approximately symmetric.
The t-statistic test is represented as follows,
t =
X¯1 − X¯2
sp
√
2
n
(4)
where,
sp =
√
s2X1 + s
2
X2
2
(5)
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Here X¯1, X¯2 and s2X1 , s
2
X2
are the means and variances of the two distributions with size n. The
t-statistic can be interpreted as a kind of measurement for the ratio of the “difference between groups”
over the “difference within groups.” Carrying out pair t-tests on all samples allows us to further be
conservative on the similarity on means between the distributions. The results are shown in Table 4.
Overall, there is no significant differences between the distributions.
To show the similarity between the distributions produced for a dataset, we also use the one-way
ANOVA test on all the samples to show that the means across different distributions are the same.
Samples here are defined as intensity vs. frequency distributions for all adversarial test samples
created by attacking a model trained on a specific dataset. For CIFAR10, we get the p-value of
0.9, and for a random subset of ImageNet test dataset we get the p-value of 0.94, indicating no
significant differences between the distribution means. Similarly, a two-sample location t-test is used
to determine if there is a significant difference between two groups where the null hypothesis is the
equality of the means. Even-though ANOVA and t-tests are known for being robust on non-normal
data, we further performed pair wise Mann–Whitney U test on all pair of distributions to test whether
the mean ranks are similar.
Mann–Whitney U test is a nonparametric test of the null hypothesis that two independent samples
selected from population have the same distribution. The statistic U is calculated as following,
U1 = R1 − n1(n1 − 1)
2
, U2 = R2 − n2(n2)
2
(6)
Where subscripts “1” and “2” denote the two distributions being compared. In the case of comparing
two distributions “sample 1” and “sample 2.” One first combines “sample 1” and “sample 2” together
to form an ordered set, and then one assigns ranks to the members of this set. Next, one adds up the
ranks for the members of the set coming from “sample 1” and “sample 2” respectively. This is called
the rank sum of R1 and R2. Once the rank sums are calculated The U statistic of the two distributions
(U1 and U2) are calculated as above. Finally, the U statistic is determined by the lower value between
U1 and U2. If U1 is lower than U2, then U1 is the U statistic of the Mann Whitney test between
“sample1” and “sample 2"” and vice versa. We further perform the pair-wise Mann–Whitney U test
on all pair of distributions to test whether the mean ranks are similar as well. If U is 0, it means that
the two distributions are far away from each other where there are no overlaps between them. If the
Rank sums are close enough, one can say the two distributions are highly overlapped. Thus, one can
say the Mann–Whitney U test is a test comparing the Rank sums (or the mean ranks, calculated by
dividing the Rank sums over the size of samples) of two distributions. The smaller values of U1 and
U2 is the one used when consulting significance tables.
C.2 Quantile-Quantile plot
Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) plot allows us to show how the quantiles of a distribution deviates from a
specified theoretical distribution. The theoretical distribution selected here is the normal distribution.
Quantiles are cut points dividing the range of a probability distribution into continuous intervals
with equal probabilities. A Q-Q plot is then a scatter-plot showing two sets of quantiles (a sample
distribution and a theoretical distribution) against one another. The x-axis are the quantile values of
the theoretical distribution while the y-axis are the quantile values of the sample distribution, i.e., the
distribution of attack intensities vs. pixel frequencies. One can see that if the quantiles of the sample
distribution perfectly match the theoretical quantiles, then one can see all the quantiles located on a
straight line. While it is unlikely to have identical distributions that perfectly match the theoretical
distribution, one can look at different sections of the Q-Q curves to distinguish the parts that two
distributions share similarity and parts that they differ. Compared to a normal distribution, if the
sample distribution has heavy or light tails, the Q-Q curve bends at the upper or lower portion based
on side of the tails that deviates from the normal distribution. One can say that one purpose of Q-Q
plots is to look at the “straightness” of the Q-Q curve. We took a subset that contains 1000 images
from both ImageNet and CIFAR10 and plotted the distributions against a normal distribution as given
in Fig. 3. It is seen that all attack distributions plotted against the normal distribution have fairly
straight lines at the middle portion of the Q-Q curve, while the curve bends at the upper part and the
lower part. One can interpret this result as the attack magnitudes are similar to a normal distribution
but differ in a way that the distributions have“heavy tails” thus the upper part of the curve bends “up”
and the lower part of the curve bends“down.”
15
2 1 0 1 2
Skewness
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
(a) PGD, LeNet, SpeechCom-
mands
1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Skewness
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
(b) PGD, CNN, Sentence Polarity
Figure 11: The Fisher-Pearson coefficient of attack magnitudes vs. frequency distributions.
C.3 The beta distribution
The beta distribution is a family of distributions defined on the interval [a, b] parametrized by two
positive shape parameters, denoted by p and q. The general formula for the probability density
function of the beta distribution can be written as,
f(x) =
(x− a)p−1(b− x)q−1
B(p, q)(b− x)p+q−1 (7)
where,
B(α, β) =
∫ 1
0
tα−1(1− t)β−1dt (8)
The beta distribution is often used to describe different types of data, such as rainfall, traffic and
financial data. In this paper, estimate the parameters of a beta distribution for our distributions.
The method of moments estimation is employed to calculate the shape parameters, p,q, of the two-
parameter beta distribution. As the interval [a, b] is known, the method of moments estimates of p
and q are
p = x¯(
x¯(1− x¯)
s2
− 1) (9)
q = (1− x¯)( x¯(1− x¯)
s2
− 1) (10)
When the interval [a, b] is [0, 1]. This is called the standard beta distribution. Since in most cases the
interval [a, b] is not bounded between [0, 1], one can replace x¯ with x¯−ab−a and s
2 with s
2
(b−a)2 . Finally
the estimated p and q of the beta distribution is listed in Table 3.
C.4 Statistical analysis of distributions for DNNs with text or audio input types
We test the symmetricity of distributions by calculating the Fisher-Pearson coefficient of skewness
for LeNet trained on Speech Commands dataset, and a convolutional neural network (CNN) given
in [33] on Polarity dataset. The Fisher-Pearson coefficients of the attack magnitudes vs. frequency
distributions for all 3 cases are shown in Fig. 11. It is seen that the skewness of all distributions falls
within the [−0.5, 0.5] range showing strong evidence that they are approximately symmetric [28].
We perform the two-sample location t-test and Mann-Whitney U test to determine if there is a
significant difference between two groups where the null hypothesis is the equality of the means.
The results reported in Table 6 indicate no significant difference between the means. Further, the
Mann-Whitney U test results indicate that all pairs are similar to each other on the mean ranks. Under
the assumption of two distributions having similar shapes, one could further state that Mann-Whitney
test can be considered as a test of medians [29]. Since, we have shown that the shapes are similar, we
can conclude that there are no significant difference between the medians of the distributions.
Next, to show consistency across distributions for a given model, dataset and attack, we estimate the
values of quantiles, means and medians. We do this by estimating the statistics of the distributions
16
Dataset LeNet, SpeechCommands, PGD CNN, Sentence Polarity, PGD
Test t-test Mann-Whitney t-test Mann-Whitne
p-value 0.30 0.25 0.47 0.42
Table 6: p-values for the mean similarity statistical tests at significance level 0.05.
LeNet, SpeechCommands, PGD CNN, Sentence Polarity, PGD
15th Quantile (−4.110e− 3,−4.049e− 3) (−2.753e− 1,−2.673e− 1)
25th Quantile (−1.150e− 3,−1.109e− 3) (−1.472e− 1,−1.414e− 1)
Mean (1.749e− 5, 2.245e− 5) (−4.165e− 3,−2.492e− 3)
Median (−4.181e− 09, 1.356e− 09) (−2.142e− 3,−6.219e− 4)
75th Quantile (1.145e− 3, 1.204e− 3) (1.365e− 1, 1.421e− 1)
85th Quantile (4.153e− 3, 4.220e− 3) (2.599e− 1, 2.677e− 1)
Table 7: Estimations for mean, median, 15th , 25th, 75th and 85th quantiles at 95% confidence level.
and constructing confidences intervals. For each experiment, we estimate the mean, median, 15th,
25th, 75th and 85th quantiles of each attack magnitude vs. frequency distribution for the entire test
dataset. The statistical confidence interval estimations at confidence level of 95% are reported in
Table 7. Our results show that the confidence intervals have narrow ranges and the estimations are
consistent. The estimates for the 15th, 25th, 75th and 85th quantiles indicate a strong symmetricity
with respect to the origin in all cases. Another observation is that the confidence interval of the mean
and medians are pretty narrow, supporting the results of the t-tests and Mann-Whitney U test. Finally,
we can show with high confidence that the distributions consistently follow a beta distribution. The
beta distribution is a family of distributions defined by two positive shape parameters, denoted by p
and q. The estimated p and q of the beta distribution are reported in Table 8.
D Explanations and Class Boundaries
Explaining how important features affect the predictions made by the model depends on the set
of classes the model was trained to predict. Un-targeted attacks change the prediction label of an
input to the label of its closest neighbor. Based on the different datasets that a model may have
been trained on, the label changes after attack may be significantly different. For example, given an
image of a “Beagle” and a model that is trained on a dataset consisting of labels {Cats and Dogs},
after attacking the model, the label of the image can change from “Dog” to “Cat.” But if the same
model is trained on a dataset composing of “Beagle, Golden retriever, and Egyptian Cat”, the label of
the image can change from “Beagle” to “Golden retriever,” which is a more granule change. When
an image is attacked, the features of the image will be directed to the nearest class with a similar
probability distribution in the decision layer. Let’s look at an example from ImageNet where the input
image is classified as a “convertible" by ResNet34 trained on ImageNet (given in Fig. 12). There
are multiple classes such as minivan, sports car, race car etc., under the “car" category in ImageNet.
After attacking the model, the label changes from “convertible" to “sports car.” This indicates that
“sports car” may be the nearest neighbor class to the “convertible” class. If we look at the produced
explanations we see that segments including the door are intensely attacked as given in Fig. 12b. The
fact is that the model thinks that the doors are the ‘most’ important features for switching the label
from “convertible” to “sports car.” Both classes, “convertible” and “sports car,” have similar wheels
but different doors. In order to fool the model, attacking the wheels is not of top priority, it’s the
doors that makes the difference between two classes. The fact is that the model thinks that the doors
are the most important features for classifying the original image as “convertible” and not “sports
car.” Both classes, have similar wheels but different doors. In order to fool the model, attacking the
wheels is not of top priority, it’s the doors that make the difference between two classes. After bluring
the segments of interest to the model, i.e. the door segment—Fig. 12c, and feeding the image to the
model, the predicted label changes from “convertible” to “sports car” which proves that the doors are
the major features supporting the predictions made by the model. Using adversarial attacks as the
LeNet, SpeechCommands, PGD CNN, Sentence Polarity, PGD
p (5.282e+ 1, 5.451e+ 1) (1.322e+ 1, 1.368e+ 1)
q (5.144e+ 1, 5.309e+ 1) (1.346e+ 1, 1.393e+ 1)
Table 8: Statistical estimations for parameters of beta distribution at 95% confidence level.
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force behind producing the explanations helps with finding the important features that are not only
globally important to the model (doors are important features of cars, other classes do not have doors
similar to cars), but also locally important to the model (within the car class, doors are the important
features that make a difference between a convertible and a sports car).
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 12: Left: Original image sample from ImageNet, Middle: The intensely attacked segments.
Right: The original image with the explainable parts, i.e., the doors, blurred.
There are also some explainable features that humans hardly understand but models do, these can be
called “non-robust features." [22] introduced the concept of robust and non-robust features, where
the authors indicated that there are features that humans ignore but the models are sensitive to. They
call these the non-robust features. Non-robust features are the features can easily be manipulated by
the attacker in order to fool the model. Robust features are features that are both important to the
model and also humans and at the same time invincible to small adversarial manipulations.
E Further Experiment Results
E.1 Explaining an image classification model
Fig. 13 shows two examples of the explanations produced using AXAI for image samples from
ImageNet [27] test dataset for a Resnet34 trained on ImageNet training dataset. In the first example,
Fig. 13a, the explanation results clearly show that the round control panel on an iPod is an important
feature that helps the model identify an IPod in the image. The second example, Fig. 13c, shows
how the model recognizes that there are two cats in the image (one is the reflection of the cat in the
mirror).
(a) An image of an iPod (b) Explanation (c) An image of a cat (d) Explanation
Figure 13: The explanation results for a ResNet34 image classification model trained on ImageNet.
CIFAR10 dataset [25] consists of images of size 32× 32 pixels, compared to ImageNet, these images
are low-resolution images. Fig. 14 shows the explanations produced by AXAI for sample images
from CIFAR10 dataset for an AlexNet image classification model trained on CIFAR10 training
dataset. For CIFAR10, our explanations clearly separate the background and capture the target
object. The explanation given in Fig. 14b shows that the head of the horse with the leather halter is
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recognized by the model, and the white fence behind the horse is completely ignored by the model.
This indicates that the model is well-trained. Similarly in Fig. 14d the ear and head of deer in the
image helps the model to classify the image correctly into the deer class. Images from CIFAR10
dataset are easily explained due to the nature of the dataset with most objects in the images being
located in the middle of the image and the lack of noisy background in most images.
(a) An image of a horse (b) Explanation (c) An image of a deer (d) Explanation
Figure 14: The explanation results for an AlexNet image classification model trained on CIFAR10.
E.2 Explaining an object detection model
We present two examples of explanations produced by our algorithm for a YOLOv3 object detection
model trained on the SpaceNet Building Dataset [39] to detect buildings in overhead imagery. The
produced explanation are clearly focused on areas where buildings are located and ignore empty
spaces in the images such as the top left corner of Fig. 15b. Further, as seen in Fig. 15d, the roads are
ignored and only buildings and their contours affect the predictions made by the object detector.
(a) Image sample 1 (b) Explanation (c) Image sample 2 (d) Explanation
Figure 15: The explanation results for a YOLOv3 object detection model trained on SpaceNet
Building Dataset .
E.3 Further details on the speech recognition experiment
The Speech Commands Dataset [30] is an audio dataset of short spoken words, such as “Right,”
“Three,” “Bed,” etc. The audio files are converted to spectograms and are used to train a LeNet for a
command recognition task. A spectrogram is a visual representation of the spectrum of frequencies
of a signal as it varies with time. Fig. 5a is an example of a spectrogram. The y-axis, the frequency,
of the spectograms are presented on a log-scale, the x-axis represent the time-scale, and the color bar
shows the magnitude. Fig. 5a is the frequency spectrum of a human speaking the word “Right.” It
is seen that in the time interval 0.4s to 1.1s, high magnitude is presented in the spectrum. In other
words, the speaker pronounces the word "Right" around 0.4s to 1.1s into the recorded audio file. This
is how one reads a spectrogram. Our explainable solution uses audio files as input, converts them
into spectrograms, and then generates the corresponding explanations. So if one feeds AXAI with an
audio file of a human speaking “Right,” AXAI first transforms the audio into a spectrogram shown in
Fig. 5a, and produces the explanations in Fig. 5b. The explanation will have the exact same scale as
the input, and simply masks out the unimportant parts of the spectrogram. To read the explanations,
one can refer to the original spectrogram input Fig. 5a and find where the audio is located in the
spectrogram (for example looking at the magnitudes), and then look at the corresponding location of
the explanations in Fig. 5b.
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The explanations of two examples are presented in Fig. 5. The spectrogram of the first example
“Right” and its explanation are shown in Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b. One can see from Fig. 5a that the
spoken word “’Right” appears between 0.4s to 1.1s in the spectrogram of the audio file. If one looks
at its corresponding explanation, it is seen that only time-intervals of 0.4s to 0.5s, 0.5s to 0.6s and
1.0s to 1.2s are not masked out by AXAI. This means that these intervals in the audio have great
importance for the prediction made by the model. if we look back at Fig. 5a, one then realizes that
the explanation shows that the first few and the last few seconds of the spoken word “Right” are
important to the model, and the middle part is not. Why is that? The neighboring class of “Right” is
“Five.” “Right” and “Five” differ in how "R" & "F" and "t" & "ve" are pronounced. The middle part of
“Five” and “Right” is highly similar and does not affect the model’s prediction on deciding whether
the spoken word is “Five” or “Right.” The second example is “Three.” As seen in the spectrogram,
Fig. 5c, “Three” is expressed around the time-interval 1.4s to 2.2s in the spectrogram of the audio file.
The corresponding explanation is shown in Fig. 5d. The explanation masks out almost everywhere
except 1.4s to 1.6s and a small part in 1.6s to 1.7s and 1.9s to 2.2s. Now, let’s look at the original
spectrgram of “Three” and understand what the explanation means. Since The explanation highlights
1.4s to 1.6s, which is the first few seconds of the spoken word. To understand why, one can learn
that if we attack the model, then “Three” is miss-classified as “Tree.” This indicates that the model
has learned to recognize “Three” and not “Three” by learning the difference between “Thr” and “Tr.”
The explanation tells us that the first few seconds of the audio are important (the utterance of “Thr”).
E.4 Ablation study
If a feature or a group of features is important to a model, then completely removing those features
from the input would decrease the probability of a correct prediction. Accordingly, we performed
an ablation study confirming that the explanations produced by AXAI contain important features.
This ablation method can be used to test the accuracy of an explainability solution. If the generated
explanation is faithful to the model, then removing the explanations would decrease the accuracy
of the predictions. In this section, we demonstrate a simple experiment to validate our algorithm.
Our experiment is performed as follows: 1) Generate the explanation of a targeted image X via
AXAI, where the explanation length K = 10 is selected in this experiment, 2) Blur the top 5
explanations/segments of the targeted image according to the produced explanations, feed the
modified image to the model and obtain its label, 3) repeat this process throughout the test dataset 4)
Calculate the total decrease in accuracy. We use a ResNet34 training on ImageNet for this experiment
and report the results for the entire ImageNet test dataset. Our results show that the prediction
accuracy of the DNN decreases to %43 after blurring the top 5 explanation/segments. To further
investigate, instead of blurring the top 5 explanations, we blur only the 6th to10th explanations.
This results in a %22 drop in total accuracy. Hence, we can conclude 1) AXAI generates faithful
explanations so that blurring the top explanations (the 1st-5th explanations) lead to a strong decrease
in model prediction accuracy, and 2) AXAI generates faithful explanations in order of importance,
i.e., the generated 6th to 10th explanations are also important to the model but their influence on
model predictions is relatively less than the first 5 generated explanations.
E.5 AXAI explanations for a robust model trained with adversarial training
In this subsection, we compare the explanations produced for a robust model to explanations produced
for a non-robust model. In our experiment, a robust model is a model trained on an adversarial dataset
in addition to the training dataset so that the final trained model is more robust against adversarial
attacks. Hypothetically, a robust model should focus more on robust important input features when
making predictions. We have trained a non-robust AlexNet and a robust AlexNet on CIFAR10
and produced the explanations using AXAI for test inputs. Fig. 16 shows the AXAI produced
explanations for the DNN given a sample input. It is seen that a small part of the background is
included in the explanations produced for the non-robust AlexNet. However, the AXAI generated
explanations for the robust model includes only the important features pertaining to the object in the
image. In addition, the leg of the deer is now included in the explanations as well. It is concluded
that explanations produced for the robust DNN are sharper, clearer and more robust than the ones
generated for the regularly trained DNN.
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(a) Image of a deer (b) Non-robust AlexNet (c) Robust AlexNet
Figure 16: Comparison between explanations produced by AXAI (K = 10) for AlexNet trained on
CIFAR10 with and without adversarial training
F Benchmark Tests
We test our algorithm against LIME and SHAP. We use “Gradient Explainer" in SHAP, which
integrates the f Integrated gradients algorithm with SHAP. Fig. 17 shows some sample comparisons
among the 3 algorithms for 3 cases: 1) AlexNet trained on CIFAR10, 2) ResNet34 trained on
ImageNet, 3) VGG16 trained on CIFAR100. PGDM with 20 iterations is used in our algorithm.
For ImageNet, explanations for a sample test picture belonging to “Egyptian cat" are shown in Fig.
17a, Fig. 17b, and Fig. 17c. One can see the similarity between the explanations. The explanations
produced by the 3 algorithms focused on the upper left of the image which contains the eyes of the
“Egyptian cat." Both LIME and our algorithms point to the same segment as explanations. SHAP
(Gradient Explainer) locates pixels of interest. The important pixels shown in this case aligns with
the results of LIME and AXAI. Since the default image segmentation parameters LIME chooses
do not allow for a suitable number of segments for explanation for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 due
to the resolutions of images, we lowered the Kernel size parameter to 1. The default Kernel size
parameters LIME uses for QuickShift is too large for low-resolution images. As we mentioned
before, this leads to a few very large segments in the image and neglects all the granular details in
the image. For CIFAR10, both our approach and LIME capture the upper portion of the head of the
horse including the ears and eyes (Fig. 17d, Fig. 17e). The results of SHAP point out the important
pixels located on the head, the nose and some pixels in the background (Fig. 17f). For CIFAR100,
the explanations produced by the 3 algorithms are once again highly similar (Fig. 17g, Fig. 17h,
and Fig. 17i). One can see that in many cases, pixel explanations do not serve as the best solution.
Without the segments, it is hard to grasp the meaning behind explanations, this is because the human
brain tends to comprehend image segments better than individual pixels.
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Figure 17: Comparisons between our adversarial explainability approach (Left Column), LIME
(Middle Column), and SHAP (Right Column). LIME parameters: number of perturbed samples
N = 1000, number of features M = 5. First row: ResNet34 trained on ImageNet, Second row:
AlexNet trained on CIFAR10, Third row: VGG16 trained on CIFAR100
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